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Financial crises frequently increase public 
sector borrowing and threaten some form of sov-
ereign debt crisis. Until recently, high income 
countries were thought to have become less vul-
nerable to severe banking crises that have lasting 
negative effects on growth. Since 2007, crises 
and attempted reforms in the United States and 
Europe indicate that advanced countries remain 
acutely vulnerable. Best practice from devel-
oping country experience suggests that regula-
tory constraints on the financial sector should 
be strengthened, but this is hard to do in coun-
tries where finance has a great deal of political 
power and cultural prestige, and where leverage 
is already high.
I. Lessons from Developing Countries
Private sector–led financial development can 
play an important role in sustaining economic 
growth and improving welfare. However, for 
more than 400 years and across a wide variety 
of monetary and credit systems, private finan-
cial structures have repeatedly proved prone to 
boom-bust cycles.1
Governments provide the legal and contract-
ing systems that make private financial arrange-
ments possible. Since the mid-nineteenth 
century, they have also acquired the responsi-
bility for preventing a collapse of the banking 
system.
1 The classic study of financial booms and busts is 
Kindleberger (1978). 
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Developing countries that have tried to avoid 
this responsibility, for example by eschewing 
deposit insurance, have found that—in a crisis—
stabilizing depositors’ expectations becomes 
the top priority. When a financial panic breaks 
out, expert opinion—including from the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund—
becomes adamant that retail depositors should 
be protected.2
Limiting the potential for severe financial 
crisis through well-designed regulation is a sen-
sible goal—and an important lesson from the 
Great Depression. Unfortunately, such regula-
tion has proved elusive in recent decades and 
seems unlikely in the foreseeable future.3
Properly managed sovereign debt is helpful 
to financial development because it provides a 
relatively low risk and liquid asset for both indi-
viduals and firms. It can also play an important 
role in stabilizing the macroeconomy when and 
if it enables the government to increase its bud-
get deficit as the financial system comes under 
pressure and credit conditions tighten.
Since the 1990s, some larger developing 
countries have built up their reserves of foreign 
exchange, in part to create a greater degree of 
independence from the International Monetary 
Fund—and to allow government finances to 
operate in a countercyclical manner in the face 
of crisis.
Advanced and developing countries that can 
issue debt denominated in their own currency 
do not face the same external constraint on fis-
cal policy. And reserve currency status—e.g., 
2 Recent experience in Cyprus provides a counter- 
example. But the adverse reaction to the proposed losses for 
small depositors suggests that this will not soon again be 
repeated. 
3 For example, the capital requirements required under 
Basel III are unlikely to prove sufficient over the next cycle. 
See the critique in Admati and Hellwig (2013). 
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for the dollar—can make it even easier to issue 
more debt at lower interest rates.
A stronger perceived backstop can increase 
expected stability for the financial system, and 
this both encourages a higher level of savings 
and attracts more foreign capital than would 
otherwise be the case. This implies a greater 
appetite for public sector debt, both to fund pro-
ductive projects and to allow higher levels of 
current expenditure given tax revenues.
Unfortunately, the dynamics of this system 
are not entirely stable. Experience over the past 
decade suggests we have built a global financial 
system in which there is an incentive to build 
up unsustainable and dangerous levels of both 
private and public debt.
II. The Bright Side of Financial Development
Following the Great Depression and World 
War II, the financial system in many coun-
tries was tightly controlled—meaning that 
people were limited in terms of their permit-
ted investments, and the allowed product offer-
ings of financial intermediaries were similarly 
constrained.
In the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and elsewhere this was partly to encourage the 
holding of public debt, which had been such 
an important part of paying for the war effort. 
From the 1950s, however, interest rates were 
liberalized, and a broader array of financial 
instruments became available. There was a fur-
ther surge in financial development through the 
1970s, which marked the beginning of a wave 
of deregulation.4 Capital flows into developing 
countries also became increasingly liberalized, 
while in richer countries the postwar baby boom 
generation entered the work force, bought insur-
ance, and began to save for retirement.
From the 1980s, derivatives markets took 
off, at the time seen as the ultimate indica-
tion of financial sophistication. By June 2012, 
the outstanding nominal value of derivatives 
contracts reached $179 trillion in Europe, and 
4 On the growth of the financial sector in the United 
States, see Philippon (2007). As a percent of GDP, the finan-
cial sector increased from about 1 percent before 1939 to 
nearly 9 percent before the crisis of 2008. 
$164  trillion in the United States, or 14.9 and 
10.5 times GDP, respectively.5
This large financial system has become 
intrinsic to personal financial security for many 
people. Private financial companies manage 
important parts of the payment system, as well 
as key aspects of how we insure ourselves and 
how we save for the future, including through 
pensions. Allowing the financial system to expe-
rience widespread failure is not appealing from 
either an economic or political perspective.
III. The Role of Sovereign Debt
Between 1970 and 2011, 80 percent of G20 
nations experienced at least one systemic bank-
ing crisis. On average, when comparing data 
from three years into the crisis to one year 
before, cumulative output fell 28.6 percent, and 
public debt increased by 14.6 percent of GDP. 
Central banks injected an average 21.2 percent 
of liquidity, measured as a fraction of deposits 
and nonresident liabilities, into the banking sys-
tem (Laeven and Valencia 2012).
Often central bank bailouts are kept secret, 
so official figures probably understate the sums 
used and the frequency of problems. In the IMF 
data, for example, Canada is not listed as suf-
fering a systemic banking crisis in 2008–2009, 
yet Canada’s banks received 7 percent of 
5 Banks often have multiple contracts which, when net-
ted, imply far lower exposures. The net market value of 
exposures at June 30, 2012 was 7.9 trillion of euro contracts, 
and 7.4 trillion of US dollar contracts. The netting of con-
tracts is considered acceptable by regulators because if a 
client enters into liquidation, banks are permitted to imme-
diately net the value of funds owed in different derivative 
contracts. However, there are two important instances where 
gross exposures matter. First, since the netting procedure 
during liquidation requires creditors to determine pricing 
of the contracts, there is significant risk that creditors will 
manipulate pricing to their benefit. This implies that liqui-
dating banks with larger gross exposures would involve big-
ger losses than those with smaller gross exposures. Second, 
in the event of a breakup of the euro currency union, the 
denomination of the $179 trillion in gross contracts would 
need to be assessed. It would not be reasonable to net two 
similar contracts if, following any exits from the euro, one 
of the contracts would be denominated in a different cur-
rency. (Data are calculated by the authors from Bank for 
International Settlements, Semi-Annual OTC Derivative 
Statistics at end-June 2012. Geneva.) 
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GDP in emergency assistance in March 2009 (MacDonald 2012).6
These IMF figures also do not capture other 
finance-related crises. For example, the bail-
out of Long Term Capital Management in the 
United States, and the unwinding of the tech 
bubble and related recession, are not reported 
as systemic banking crises in the United States, 
although they clearly involved major financial 
sector problems—as well as declines in asset 
values that affected the real economy.
The total cost of financial crises is rarely 
reported in its entirety. The US Treasury has 
argued that its recent bailouts were profitable for 
US taxpayers, because they managed to get back 
more than what they directly gave out. However, 
this argument is not compelling when consid-
ered more broadly.
To appreciate the full fiscal impact of the US 
financial crisis, changes in the Congressional 
Budget Office’s baseline projections are infor-
mative. In January 2008, the CBO projected that 
total government debt in private hands—the best 
measure of what the government owes—would 
fall to $5.1 trillion by 2018 (23 percent of GDP). 
As of January 2010, after the depth of the crisis 
had become clear, the CBO projected that over 
the next eight years debt would rise to $13.7 tril-
lion (over 65 percent of GDP)—a difference of 
$8.6 trillion that be attributed directly to the cost 
of the finance induced recession (Congressional 
Budget Office 2008 and 2010).
Most of this fiscal impact is not due to the 
Troubled Assets Relief Program—and defi-
nitely not due to the part of that program which 
injected capital into failing banks. Of the change 
in CBO baseline, 57 percent is due to decreased 
tax revenues resulting from the financial crisis 
and recession; 17 percent is due to increases in 
discretionary spending, some of it the stimulus 
package necessitated by the financial crisis (and 
because the “automatic stabilizers” in the United 
States are relatively weak); and another 14 per-
cent is due to increased interest payments on the 
6 Beyond this liquidity provided to Canadian banks, the 
relationship between government and banks in Canada also 
permits substantial implicit transfers at times of crisis. In 
January 2009 the CEO of Toronto Dominion Bank, Edmund 
Clark, rallied investors to buy preference shares that the 
bank was trying to issue by stating “Maybe not explicitly, 
but what are the chances that TD Bank is not going to be 
bailed out if it did something stupid?” (Bloomberg News, 
January 23, 2009). 
debt—because the United States now has more 
debt.
The Federal Reserve lowered the Fed Funds 
rate from 5.25 percent in August 2007 to essen-
tially zero. Savers are subsidizing the financial 
sector in order that large banks and other firms 
can rebuild their equity capital.
The costs to societies of financial crises are 
invariably obfuscated by large indirect transfers 
and costs. This contributes to the fact that once 
the crisis is over, the regulatory system relaxes, 
and new risks build up.
Regulators are unable or unwilling to measure 
risks appropriately, and once a credit boom gets 
under way, poor lending and accounting prac-
tices can be hidden for years. Cumulative losses 
eventually lead to another crisis.
When crises occur, central banks and gov-
ernments step in to ensure the system is stable. 
They lower interest rates, bail out institutions, 
and they increase fiscal spending.
The lesson from developing countries is there 
are advantages from keeping regulation tighter 
and capital requirements higher. This was the 
lesson drawn, for example, from the experience 
in 1982 in Chile and from 1997–1998 in Korea 
and other Asian countries. But the financial sec-
tor in those places is smaller and less powerful 
than in today’s rich countries. Financial devel-
opment transforms the political economy of 
finance.
IV. Hitting the Debt Limit
It is hard to know how much debt any gov-
ernment can safely issue before risk premiums 
start rising in a dangerous manner. Ghosh et al. (2011) attempted to measure “fiscal space,” 
meaning how much extra debt markets would 
tolerate, by examining the historical response of 
fiscal policy (measured by the primary budget 
balance) to changes in the debt stock. If, when 
debt stocks rise, policymakers raise the primary 
surplus enough to finance it, then investors may 
be confident that higher debts will be repaid.
This is a sensible but not very demanding 
test—it calls on governments to show willing-
ness to reduce budget deficits enough to finance 
the interest costs of additional debt. Even so, 
after examining 23 advanced nations’ responses 
to deficits, and their projected debt levels in 
2015, the authors concluded nine nations were 
at or near their limits to accumulate additional 
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debts—including Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, 
and Portugal.
Ito, Watanabe, and Yabu (2011) found that 
since 1970, Japan’s fiscal regime has been on an 
explosive path—in the sense that there was no 
tendency to adjust budgets as debt levels rise. In 
contrast, they found that during the prewar era 
under the gold standard, as well as during the 
1950s–1970s, Japan’s debt policies were not on 
this explosive path.
This research paints a bleak picture for several 
nations, and Ghosh et al. correctly anticipated 
difficulties in Europe’s periphery. However, 
it does not explain why there is a consistent 
upward trend in indebtedness in all G7 nations 
since 1972. Indeed, in the fiscal space models, if 
debt levels continue to drift upwards, then even-
tually all nations will reach their debt capacity, 
and at that point every nation would be on a path 
to crisis.7
When authors conclude that nations have 
manageable debt burdens, they make a key 
assumption that the behavioral response of 
nations to debt problems remains the same in 
the future as it was in the past. A plausible alter-
native assumption is that the responsiveness of 
fiscal policy to debt levels may weaken in many 
wealthy nations. Aging populations increase the 
median and mean age of voters, and this places 
more pressure on spending for health and pen-
sions. The elderly are more likely to support 
debt finance as they are not required to service 
or repay the debt. Even if debts are on an unsus-
tainable path, any crises may occur well after 
their lifetimes.
Low interest rates reduce incentives to cut 
budget deficits. Business lobbies and households 
with mortgages are key actors who pressure 
governments to cut deficits, hoping to reduce 
interest rates. This was a major factor behind 
Bill Clinton’s steps to reduce the deficit dur-
ing his first term in office (Johnson and Kwak 
2012). However, real interest rates are currently 
at historic lows, and they may remain low for 
an extended period due to aging and the need to 
recapitalize parts of the economy.
Low interest rates also buttress the lobbies 
that call for more spending. Given high levels of 
leverage, it is no surprise that, in the  aftermath 
7 It also does not take into account off-balance liabilities 
such as unfunded pension schemes. 
of crises, companies and households try to 
rebuild their equity capital. This drives up sav-
ings rates and lowers interest rates. It becomes 
reasonable to argue there is no better time for 
governments to invest in the future, as well as 
support demand, since the costs of such support 
are small compared to the benefits (DeLong and 
Summers 2012).
In the depths of crisis, there is near unani-
mous agreement that policymakers must appro-
priately provide emergency liquidity to prevent 
bank runs, and support the unemployed. Often 
the same people who guided the country in its 
run-up to the crisis turn now to design rescue 
programs for banks and new spending programs 
for governments.
The interest groups in favor of spending align 
with financial sector lobbyists calling for delays 
to reforms—arguing that such delays will help 
support lending. There is little appetite for tough 
reforms as the economy struggles to recover.
Once growth resumes, the case for financial 
sector reform seems less pressing. The high cul-
tural prestige of finance, combined with the gov-
ernment’s need to sell debt, means that financial 
sector executives continue to run fiscal policy (Johnson and Kwak 2010).
The scope for issuing more public sector debt 
makes it possible for rich countries to ignore the 
very large risks posed by the financial sector. 
President Obama’s 2014 budget recommenda-
tions imply deficits would continue for a decade 
and the level of US debt relative to GDP would 
stabilize around current levels. There is no appe-
tite for linking discussion of financial sector 
risks with implications for government debt over 
the medium term.
In the United Kingdom, while the current 
recession is far less severe than in 1991–1993, 
or the early eighties (as measured by unemploy-
ment), the government is running significantly 
larger budget deficits than in those recessions. 
From 2009–2012, the government ran cumula-
tive deficits of 36 percent of GDP, and under the 
current program, deficits will continue such that 
the Debt/GDP ratio stabilizes only in 2016.
Across advanced economies, Germany cur-
rently stands out as a nation where sound fiscal 
policies are publicly supported. However, even 
Germany has built up large public debts, while 
letting its banking system sink into crisis, dur-
ing the last three decades. It was the German 
and French governments that initially backed 
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efforts to weaken Europe’s stability and growth 
pact in the early 2000s. Today, Germany’s new 
demands for fiscal rectitude probably reflect its (possibly temporary) role as a large creditor to 
other EU nations. Those credits arose as it pro-
vided well over 25 percent of GDP in opaque 
Bundesbank financing, as well as more direct 
support, to peripheral EU nations.8
These dynamics imply that government debt 
accumulation now will tend to follow a step 
function. With each crisis governments let bud-
get deficits increase, and they effectively use 
public debt to bail out and otherwise support 
“systemic” and favored institutions. When the 
crisis ends, there is little appetite to reign in bud-
gets or stick to tough regulations, so debt stays 
at the elevated level until the next crisis occurs. 
Thus, debt/GDP ratios continue to rise.9
V. Reducing the Leverage Bias
There is a natural bias in advanced nations’ 
political systems towards private debt finance 
with a contingent public debt backstop. This 
reflects aging populations and lack of represen-
tation from future generations who are expected 
to bear the cost of this debt. It also reflects 
opaque and complicated accounting, which 
invariably permits politicians to obfuscate the 
true costs of debt.
The balance of political forces is inclined 
against stability. In the financial sector, power-
ful firms can lobby and work with current politi-
cians to relax or avoid regulation, and ultimately 
generate excessive credit expansions and other 
risks. Taxpayers are the main losers from such 
deals, but advanced countries have managed to 
postpone costs by issuing public sector debts, so 
ultimately it is future generations who pay for 
the damage caused by financial sector excess 
risk-taking today.
A first step to improving the political bal-
ance is to enlist the energy of creditors in favor 
of better capitalized private financial interme-
diaries. Creditors set the price for leverage at 
8 Bundesbank financing is provided through the euro sys-
tem payments mechanism. These claims of the Bundesbank 
on troubled EU nations amounted to over 25 percent of 
German GDP at end 2012. Any losses on these loans should 
legally be shared amongst euro system nations. 
9 In Boone and Johnson (2010) we suggested the term 
“doomsday cycle” for this phenomenon. 
 institutions, and they can monitor them. If credi-
tors expect they will lose money in crises, then 
they will be more likely to monitor and price 
risk appropriately.
There are measures that nations and regulators 
can take. We can implement strict “no  bailout” 
laws which require creditor bail-in before pub-
lic funds can be used. But these need to be time 
consistent—the failure of any “systemically 
important” financial institution will always tend 
to attract a bailout.
We can also require simple capital structures 
which permit regulators to impose losses on cer-
tain categories of creditors early in the process. 
Larger buffers of equity and contingent capital, 
as called for in Basel III, will help—but they are 
probably not enough.
The ability to implement resolution across 
borders is also essential. Ex ante crisis plan-
ning—the so-called living wills—needs to 
become much more transparent.
We should strengthen our regulators too. In 
many nations, policymakers and regulators can 
currently move freely between private and pub-
lic service. In private service they lobby against 
or find loopholes in the same regulations they 
were supposed to support in public service. The 
fact that lucrative employment is available to 
regulators, and those setting policy, when they 
move to the private sector creates an important 
conflict of interest that undermines sound regu-
lation. Multiyear restrictions which prevent such 
revolving door practices should be applied to 
financial sector policymakers.
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